Inon Zuckerman, Sarit Kraus, Jeffrey Rosenschein, Gal Kaminka. An
Adversarial Environment Model for Bounded Rational Agents in Zero-Sum
Interactions. Proceeding of AAMAS 07, USA

Multiagent environments are often not cooperative nor collaborative; in 
many cases, agents have conflicting interests, leading to adversarial 
interactions. This paper presents a formal \emph{Adversarial 
Environment} model for bounded rational agents operating in a zero-sum 
environment. In such environments, attempts to use classical 
utility-based search methods can raise a variety of difficulties (e.g., 
implicitly modeling the opponent as an omniscient utility maximizer, 
rather than leveraging a more nuanced, explicit opponent model).
We define an Adversarial Environment by describing the mental states of 
an agent in such an environment. We then present behavioral axioms that 
are intended to serve as design principles for building such adversarial 
agents. We explore the application of our approach by analyzing log 
files of completed Connect-Four games, and present an empirical analysis 
of the axioms' appropriateness.