Raz Lin, Sarit Kraus, Yuval Shavitt. On the Benefits of Cheating by Self-Interested Agents in Vehicular Networks. Proceeding of AAMAS 07, USA As more and more cars are equipped with GPS and Wi-Fi transmitters, it becomes easier to design systems that will allow cars to interact autonomously with each other, e.g., regarding the traffic on the roads. Indeed, car manufacturers are already equipping their cars with such devices. Though, currently these systems are proprietary, we envision a natural evolution where agents applications will be developed for vehicular systems, e.g., to improve car routing in dense urban areas. However, this new technology and agent application may lead to the emergent of self-interested car owners, who will care more about their own welfare than the social welfare of their peers. These car owners will try to manipulate their agents such that they transmit false data to their peers. Using a simulation environment, which models a real transportation network in a large city, we demonstrate the benefits achieved by the self-interested agents if no counter-measures are implemented.