Possible papers for the seminar

1. The assignment game I: The core L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik
2. Matching with Contracts. Hatfield and Millgrom
3. School choice: A mechanism design approach‏ by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez.
4. The Boston public school match. A Abdulkadiroğlu, PA Pathak, AE Roth.
5. Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions by AE Roth, X Xing
6. Kidney Exchange Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez M. Utku Ünver
7. Strategy-proof and efficient kidney exchange using a credit mechanism‏ by Hajaj, Dickerson, Hassidim, Sandholm, Sarne
8. Unbalanced random matching markets. I Ashlagi, Y Kanoria, JD Leshno
9. Thou Shalt Covet Thy Neighbor's Cake. By Ariel D. Procaccia.
10. Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. Segal Halevi, Hassidim, Aumann
11. Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions Segal Halevi, Hassidim, Aumann
12. [Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods](http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~noam/non-price.pdf) by A. Hassidim, H. kaplan, Y. Mansour, and N. Nisan.
13. Composable and efficient mechanisms. V Syrgkanis, E Tardos
14. Algorithmic Mechanism Design By Nisan and Ronen
15. Competitive Analysis of Online Auctions by R. Lavi and N. Nisan. EC 2000.
16. Arrow’s theorem + Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem