Possible papers for the seminar

1. The assignment game I: The core L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik
2. Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

Alexander S. Kelso, Jr.; Vincent P. Crawford

1. Matching with Contracts By JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD AND PAUL R. MILGROM
2. Kidney Exchange Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez M. Utku Ünver
3. Erdil and Ergin, what's the matter with tie breaking
4. Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions by AE Roth, X Xing

Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets

By SM Lee

1. Unbalanced random matching markets. I Ashlagi, Y Kanoria, JD Leshno
2. [Optimal auction design](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3689266) by Myerson – lecture notes by hartline and roughgarden. Also Bulow and Klemperer on optimal auction vs. adding one item.
3. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

Paul R. Milgrom; Robert J. Weber

1. [Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods](http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~noam/non-price.pdf) by A. Hassidim, H. kaplan, Y. Mansour, and N. Nisan.
2. Composable and efficient mechanisms. V Syrgkanis, E Tardos
3. Sequential Auctions and Externalities [Renato Paes Leme](http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Leme_R/0/1/0/all/0/1), [Vasilis Syrgkanis](http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Syrgkanis_V/0/1/0/all/0/1" \t "_blank), [Eva Tardos](http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Tardos_E/0/1/0/all/0/1)
4. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding K Bhawalkar, T Roughgarden
5. Monderer, D., and Shapley, L.S. (1996-a) "Potential Games", *Games and Economic Behavior* 14, 124-143.
6. Competitive Analysis of Online Auctions by R. Lavi and N. Nisan. EC 2000.