Universally Composable Two-Party and Multiparty Secure Computation

Ran Canetti, Yehuda Lindell, Rafail Ostrovsky and Amit Sahai


We show how to securely realize any multi-party functionality in a universally composable way, regardless of the number of corrupted participants. That is, we consider a multi-party network with open communication and an adversary that can adaptively corrupt as many parties as it wishes. In this setting, our protocols allow any subset of the parties (with pairs of parties being a special case) to securely realize any desired functionality of their local inputs, and be guaranteed that security is preserved regardless of the activity in the rest of the network. This implies that security is preserved under concurrent composition of an unbounded number of protocol executions, it implies non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. Our constructions are in the common reference string model and make general intractability assumptions.

STOC version: Postscript, gzipped Postscript.

Full version: Postscript, gzipped Postscript.

Back Home